Approved For Release 2002/08/22 CIA-RDP56-00071A000100020005-1

TASK PORCH STUTE

I. Problem.

To report on certain expects of emergency evacuation and post-evacuation operational planning for Agency overseas operations and take recommendations for Agency action.

II. Disgussion.

- A. It is acknowledged that the subject of emergency operational planning is outside the province of this Bask Force which was established to attack dertain covert administrative problems. However, in the course of other Task Force work, questions have been raised which should be unde known to the appropriate Agency officials. Two senior intelligence officers recently returned from responsible eversees posts have prepared memory and on the subject which are attached hereto as Exhibits 4, and 3.
- B. Detailed discussion here would be the repetitions of those removaria. However, contain generalizations may be pointed up which may not be immediately apparent. With the single exception of Communications there appears to have been little or no Agency direction or coordination of such planning even for the immediate emergency evacuation to say nothing of the equally important post-evacuation reorganization and emploitation of both American and indigenous personnel. Local evacuation plans may well have to be made station by station. However, it would seem imperative that they be coordinated into area plans which would not only require Division action at imalguarters but also close linison between 050 and OFC opposite numbers. The over-all plans necessarily reald in turn have to be in terms of certain Agency of sumptions and policies which would provide for alternate ection contingent upon the form and direction of the precipitating events.
- c. The attached memoranda and this paper do not address themselves to stay-behind operations which are a separate roblem and which are individually receiving, no doubt, the prepar attention up or present procedures. The attached memoranda refer to a discussion of the jossible need for regulations covering the problem of evacuation. Further consideration does not indicate that this is a proper ratter for regulations as such jut rather for the formation of a staff which would have as its sole responsibility the planning, coordination and progressive revision and supervision of a progressive revision and supervision of a progress.

III. Recom endations.

It is recommended that this paper and attached memoranes be referred to the appropriate Agency officials with the suggestion that sufficient staff be furnished to handle this very complex and urgent problem.

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